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INTRODUCTION

A

LTHOUGH AIRCRAFT are small contributors to the probem of global warming, stricter limits on aircraft emissions
will soon be in place. Prior to the Kyoto Protocol,1 two United
Nations organizations were vying for the right to regulate aircraft emissions: the United Nations' Framework Convention on
Climate Change (FCCC) and the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO).
The Kyoto Protocol, the treaty arising from the FCCC's meeting in December 1997, makes clear that ICAO is, and will be, the
principal forum to pursue the subject of greenhouse gas emissions from international civil aviation. 2 However, the question
of whether ICAO is the forum for addressing greenhouse gas
emissions from purely domestic flights remains open.
Successful global limitations of greenhouse gases will be best
achieved through international agreements that are narrowly
tailored to fix the problem they seek to address. A specific, prescriptive, and quantitative approach is necessary to limit aircraft
emissions successfully.' In theory, a comprehensive solution

.C

I See Report of the Conference of the Partieson its Third Session, Held at Kyoto From 1 to
11 December 1997, U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, 3d Sess., 12th
plen. mtg., Annex, at 7, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1 [hereinafter Kyoto
Protocol].
2 The Kyoto Protocol expressly recognizes ICAO as the global organization responsible for the reduction or limitation of international aviation emissions. See
id. art. 2(2), at 9.
3 "[T] he projected explosion in demand [for air travel] will create an inexorable upward pressure on emissions unless policies are specifically aimed at limiting
them." Emissions from Aircraft Could Become Significant in 50 Years, EDF Study Says,
[1994] Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) 1994 DEN 141, at D4 (July 26, 1994) (quoting
ENVIRONMENTAL

DEFENSE FUND, AIRCRAFT EMISSIONS AND THE GLOBAL ATMOS-

PHERE: LONG TERM SCENARIOS (1994)) [hereinafter EDF Study].
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such as the FCCC's flexible and general approach, covering all
emissions of greenhouse gases, is appealing. In practice, however, scientific uncertainty, informational problems, and difficulties with enforcement make the FCCC a sieve rather than a
bar to emissions.
Control of aviation emissions is best conducted at the international level by an organization with technical expertise over
both aviation and aircraft emissions. The United Nations' specialized agency that manages worldwide civil aviation issues, including emissions, is ICAO. The agency has a proven record of
leadership in regulating aircraft emissions and has developed a
substantial base of technical, safety, and operational knowledge.
In presenting the treaty framework that limits or reduces aircraft emissions, this Article first provides an overview of the science and policy surrounding global warming. It then examines
the aviation sector, focusing in particular on the Chicago Convention, which created ICAO, and on ICAO's environmental
activities. Next, it examines the FCCC's history and the recently
adopted Kyoto Protocol. Finally, the Article argues that emissions of greenhouse gases from civil aviation are better handled
by ICAO than by the FCCC.
II.

GLOBAL WARMING

In recent years, global warming has drawn the world's attention. Science, albeit uncertain, suggests that dramatic changes
to our climate may occur if greenhouse gas emissions are not
curbed. 4 In fact, scientists predict that rising global temperatures could affect agricultural activities worldwide; lead to Dust
Bowl conditions; cause the sea level to rise and flood coastal areas; disrupt fisheries; alter some plant and animal species; and
lead to record heat waves and other weather abnormalities that
could harm people, crops, and forests.5
A.

SCIENCE

Greenhouse gases occur naturally in the atmosphere, allowing
sunlight to reach and warm the Earth's surface. But unlike
4

See OFFICE

OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS,

CHANGING

BY DE-

GREES: STEPS TO REDUCE GREENHOUSE GASES, OTA-0-482, at 3 (1991) [hereinafter
OTA REPORT].
5 See generally, ANDREW REVKIN, AMERICAN MUSEUM OF NATURAL HISTORY ENVIRONMENTAL

(1992).

DEFENSE FUND,

GLOBAL WARMING:

UNDERSTANDING

THE FORECAST

700

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

other atmospheric gases, they trap heat in the atmosphere. This
natural warming of the Earth's atmosphere and surface is called
the "greenhouse effect." Burning fossil fuels, deforestation, and
use of nitrogen fertilizers and chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) 6 -all
generate human-caused, or anthropogenic, emissions-increase
substantially the natural concentrations of greenhouse gases,
also increasing trapped heat.' In 1995, the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change's Second Assessment Report, for the first
time, supported the proposition that "[t] he balance of the evidence .'' s. . suggests a discernible human influence on global

climate.

8

The key anthropogenic greenhouse gases are carbon dioxide
(CO 2 ), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N 2 0), chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), and tropospheric ozone (0 3 ).9 Carbon dioxide

emissions, resulting from the consumption of fossil fuels, have
been responsible for more than half of the enhanced greenhouse effect." Carbon monoxide (CO) and nitrogen oxide
(NOx) are not greenhouse gases, but these two gases indirectly
affect the climate because they chemically interact with other
gases. 11
Scientific and socioeconomic uncertainties make the effects
of global warming difficult to predict. Scientists agree that increases in greenhouse gases will result in climate change, but
they disagree about the magnitude, timing, and regional distribution of the warming. 12 In addition, lack of scientific understanding about some of the greenhouse gas sources and the
processes that influence their atmospheric concentrations renThe production and use of CFCs are limited by the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Delete the Ozone Layer (Montreal Protocol). Discussion of
CFCs and the Montreal Protocol are not within the scope of this Article.
7 See OTA REPORT, supra note 4, at 3; Climate Change: The IPCC Scientific Assessment, Intergovernmental Panel On Climate Change, WMO/UNEP at xi (1990)
[hereinafter IPCC Scientific Assessment Report].
8 IPCC Second Assessment Synthesis of Scientific Technical Information Relevant to InterpretingArticle 2 of the LW Framework Convention on Climate Change (1995), Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, at 3 (1995) (visited Apr. 23, 1997)
<http://www.unep.ch/ipcc/syntrep.html>.
9 See OFFICE OF POLICY, PLANNING, AND EVALUATION, UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, 21P-2003.1,
POLICY OPTIONS FOR STABILIZING
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE: REPORT TO CONGRESS, MAIN REPORT I-1 (1990) [hereinafter EPA REPORT].
10 See id. at V-7.
llSee id. at IV-45.
12 See id. at I-1.
6
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ders projections of global warming incomplete. 3 For instance,
there is scientific uncertainty about the "uptake of heat and CO 2
by the ocean and any other sinks, geophysical and biogeochemical feedback mechanisms, and natural rates of emission of the
greenhouse gases."14 And, there is socioeconomic uncertainty
about "population growth, GNP growth, structural changes in
economic systems, rates of technological change, future reliance
on fossil fuels, and future compliance with the Montreal
Protocol.

15

Aircraft contribute approximately two to three percent of the
total anthropogenic CO 2. Although the aviation sector thus
seems responsible for only a small portion of total anthropogenic emissions, some scientists believe that because aircraft
emissions take place at a high altitude they might have a disproportionate effect on the atmosphere. 6 Further, the continuing
rapid growth of air transport services makes aircraft emissions
an important global issue. An Environmental Defense Fund
study found that the combined effect of CO 2 and NOx emissions
from aircraft could account for up to ten percent of all humaninduced climate change in the latter part of the twenty-first
century.

17

B.

POLICY

Policy issues raised by global warming are just as complex and
vexing as the scientific issues. For instance, limiting current
greenhouse gas emissions would likely decrease the magnitude
and speed of global warming; however, scientific uncertainties
relating to global warming make it difficult for policymakers to
determine the correct course. Given the long-lasting consequences of decisions made today, great care and attention need
to be paid to how emissions' abatement is structured.
Furthermore, taking action to limit global warming involves
making tough political decisions. Emissions' abatement forces
policymakers to balance the long-term effects of altering the
13

See

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GLOBAL WARMING:

POSSIBLE AS SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTIES ARE RESOLVED,

EMISSION REDUCTIONS

GAO/RCED-90-58, 28

(Sept. 1990).
14

EPA

15

Id.

REPORT,

supra note 9, at 1-12.

16 See ICAO, Information Kit for ICAO's 50th Anniversary (Dec. 7, 1994) (visited
Apr. 14, 1997) <http://www.cam.org/~icao/info50.htm> [hereinafter Information
Kit].
17 See EDF Study, supra note 3.

702

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

human environment against the exorbitant short-term costs of
abating emissions. For instance, William Nordhaus, an economist from Yale University, estimates that limiting U.S. greenhouse gases could cost as much as $7 trillion.' 8
Finally, policymakers need to take into consideration the
problem's global scope, and seek international solutions to reduce greenhouse gases. Both developed and developing countries need to take action. Developing countries, as they
continue to industrialize, are expected to increase their CO 2
emissions, further exacerbating global warming.
In response to these concerns and pressures, policymakers
have been working to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions.
It is good that they do so because they cannot afford to wait to
see what the full impact of continued emissions will be, especially given that the time lag between emissions and their full
impact may range from decades to centuries.19
III.
A.

AVIATION SECTOR

DISTINGUISHING CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SECTOR

International aviation plays a major role in the world economy and any reduction of, or restraints on, aviation would affect
international trade, international business, and tourism. 20 Aviation is also critical to national defense. Air transport is singled
out from other service sectors because it operates internationally
and affects the international economy.
Unlike other sectors of the economy, aviation is highly sensitive to fuel price changes: fuel costs make up the largest percentage of total operating costs. Increases in fuel costs generally
result in less service to remote communities, an increase in
prices to consumers for air services, and a drop in demand for
new aircraft. The significance of fuel prices has led to a great
deal of research on opportunities for efficiency improvements. 2 1
Aircraft travel is the safest mode of available transportation.
The fatality rate in 1992 was 0.06 passenger fatalities per 100
18 See Pollution Tax: Bad Idea to Remedy Global Warming, TIMEs-PICAYUNE, Mar.

18, 1997, at B6.
19 See OTA REPORT, supra note 4, at 3.
21 See Laurie Michaelis, OECD, Special Issues in Carbon/Energy Taxation: Carbon

Charges on Aviatio4 Fuels, "Policies and Measures for Common Action" Working
Paper 12, Annex I Expert Group on the UNFCCC, Supported by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the International Energy
Agency, at 34 (Mar. 1997) [hereinafter OECD Report].
21 See EPA REPORT, supra note 9, at V-25.
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million passenger kilometers.22 The international aviation community's remarkable safety record is in great part attributable to
technological innovation and ICAO's role in setting corresponding international Standards and Recommended Practices.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the
international scientific body directing international atmospheric
research on global warming, has recognized the aviation sector's
unique nature. The IPCC has begun a study of the atmospheric
effects of aviation, due in April 1999. This report is likely to be
treated as the authoritative scientific research document on the
aviation sector's effect on the climate.
B.

GROWrH

Air transportation of passengers, freight, and mail has been
growing rapidly. In 1945, 9 million people traveled on sched24
uled air services. 23 In 1993, 1.2 billion people were carried.
The ICAO projects that in 2001, 1.8 billion passengers will be
carried. 25 In a March 1997 forecast, ICAO found that, between
1995 and 2005, world airline scheduled passenger traffic is expected to grow at an average annual rate of 5.5 percent, and
is expected to grow at an average annual rate
total freight traffic
26
of 7 percent.
Air traffic grew about three times as fast as the gross national
product in the early 1970s and twice as fast since the early
1980S. 27 Since the 1960s, air traffic has declined only once, in
1991 as a result of the Gulf War and travelers' fears about terrorism. 28 From 1990 to 1995 air traffic grew at an average of 6.5

percent per year. 29 Air traffic is expected to continue to grow as
a result of deregulation in developed countries and industrialization in developing countries.3 0 Assuming these growth rates
continue, countries' decisions that affect aviation in the next
five to ten years will influence emission levels for decades to
come.
22 See Information Kit, supra note 16, at 22.
23 See id.
24 See id.

25 See id.

26 See ICAO, Growth in Air Traffic To Continue: ICAO Releases Long-Term Forecasts
(Mar. 1997) (visited Apr. 5, 1997) <http://www.cam.org/home/icao/pubIichtml/nr/pio9704.htm>.
27 See OECD Report, supra note 20, at 15.
28

See id.

See id. at 5.
30 See id.

29
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C.

EMISSIONS

Emissions from aircraft include smoke, C0 2 , water vapor, CO,
and NOx. Aircraft contribute two to three percent of the world's
anthropogenic CO 2 emissions. In 1990, world civil aviation was
responsible for approximately 420 million tonnes of C0 2, of

which about half was due to international traffic." By 1995
2
those emissions grew to approximately 550 million tonnes.1
The United States has no domestic or international obligations
to regulate or set standards for aircraft emissions of carbon
dioxide.
It is unclear what effect aircraft emissions of CO and NOx
have on the environment. Some researchers believe that NO,
emissions act as a significant greenhouse gas precursor and that
its radiative impact may be as large as that of CO 2 emissions. 33 It
is also unclear what effect reducing aircraft NOx emissions will
have on greenhouse gases. For instance, reducing aircraft emissions of NO, may increase CO 2.3 4
There are several ways of limiting aviation emissions, but each
carries a heavy price: mandatory phase-out of older aircraft;
technology-forcing engine certification requirements; 3 5 operational restrictions on aircraft; or an emissions budget-similar
to the emissions budget proposed by the United States for the
Third Conference of the Parties to the FCCC-for civil aviation.36 The most frequently suggested proposal is to levy fuel or
emissions taxes. Each proposal, if implemented, may well lead
to some increase in airline fares and air cargo rates, diminished
airline service to smaller cities, and job losses in the airline,
aerospace manufacturing, and travel and tourism sectors. Furthermore, at least some of the proposals are likely to violate international treaty obligations.
Aircraft emissions and noise are the two major environmental
problems associated with civil aviation. Engine designs are balSee id.
See id.
33 See id. at 12.
34 See Paul Page, U.S. Wants Airline Emissions Studied by Global Panel on Aviation
Environment, TRAFFIC WORLD, Dec. 11, 1995, at 39; Kristin S. Krause, Aviation's
Impact, Los Angeles Airport Air,Jet Engine Emissions Among Concerns of Industry Policymakers for 1997, TRAFFIC WORLD, Dec. 2, 1996, at 34.
15 See infra notes 81-96 and accompanying text.
36 The Environmental Defense Fund has recommended that an emissions
budget for civil aviation be created. See OECD Report, supra note 20, app. F, at
58 (suggested language to address emissions budgets for civil aviation put forward by Environmental Defense Fund).
31
32
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anced to optimize performance in meeting a wide range of
objectives: safety, reliability, noise, emissions, and fuel efficiency. Unfortunately, the operational performance requirements of a jet turbine engine are many, varied, and sometimes
in conflict. Emission stringency must be considered within this
broad context of total engine performance objectives because
reducing one objective may increase another, e.g., reducing
noise increases fuel burn, which results in greater emissions.
IV.

CHICAGO CONVENTION

The basic instrument governing international civil aviation is
the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention), a multilateral treaty negotiated in November 1944 at
the International Civil Aviation Conference in Chicago. The
conference, an outgrowth of World War II when some commercial aircraft previously used for carrying passengers and mail38
were put to military use, 9 reflected international concern over
whether development of aviation could "serve peace as efficiently as it had served war."4 The conference set out to formulate international technical and economic standards and to
establish institutions to effect and maintain the agreed upon
standards.41
37
38

TION

See Page, supra note 34, at 39.
See PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, LAW &

FOREIGN POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL

AvIA-

9 (1987).

39 See
(1980).

BETSY GIDWITZ, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT

43-44

40 JACQUES NAVEAU, INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT IN A CHANGING WORLD 26

(1989). Interestingly, the Chicago Convention's first words bespeak this concern:
"the future development of international civil aviation can greatly help to create
and preserve friendship among the nations and peoples of the world, yet its
abuse can become a threat to general security." Convention On International
Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, Preamble, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295, 296 [hereinafter Chicago Convention].
41

The technical aims concerned setting up international arrangements for licensing pilots and mechanics, registering and certifying the airworthiness of aircraft, standardization and planning
for the development of navigational aids, collecting statistics, exchanging technical information, and similar essential technical
tasks and procedures. The economic objectives included: the assignment of air routes to nations and to airlines; the arrangement
for setting air fares, frequencies, schedules, and capacities; and
methods of facilitating interairline fare transfers, customs arrangements, cooperation in servicing and coordination of schedules. An
extremely important subgroup of aims at the conference concerned the arrangements for obtaining authority to overfly an-
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Ultimately, the Chicago Convention established guidelines for
flight over signatory states' territory, aircraft nationality, air navigation rules, conditions of individual aircraft, and international
Standards and Recommended Practices. The Chicago Convention also established ICAO.
The Chicago Convention set the principles for the postwar
operation of international civil aircraft. The Convention recognizes that every state "has complete and exclusive sovereignty
over the airspace above its territory"4 2 and that no national sovereignty exists over the high seas. The principle of sovereignty,
however, is limited by each state's obligation to observe the general interests of international civil aviation. For instance, a contracting state has the right of non-scheduled flight over another
contracting state.4"
The Chicago Convention's goal was to achieve a system of uniform regulation of matters affecting international aviation. In
terms of adopting international standards and procedures, the
Convention calls on contracting states to "collaborate in securing the highest practicable degree of uniformity in regulations,
standards, procedures, and organization in relation to aircraft,
personnel, airways and auxiliary services in all matters in which
such uniformity will facilitate and improve air navigation."44
The Chicago Convention vests ICAO with the authority to
adopt and amend international Standards and Recommended
Practices dealing with, among other things, "safety, regularity,
and efficiency of air navigation," and airworthiness of aircraft.45
Departing from international standards and procedures requires a contracting state to notify ICAO immediately and ICAO
to immediately notify all other contracting states of the difference existing between the international standard and practice of
the non-compliant state.46
other nation's sovereign territory and to make stops in foreign
territory for technical reasons, that is, for fuel and maintenance.
ROBERT L. THORNTON, INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES AND POLITICS 20 (1970), quoted in
GIDWITZ, supra note 39, at 46 (1980).
42 Chicago Convention, supra note 40, art. 1, 61 Stat. at 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. at
296.
43 See id. art. 5, 61 Stat. at 1181, 15 U.N.T.S. at 298.
44 Id. art. 37, 61 Stat. at 1190-91, 15 U.N.T.S. at 320.
45 Id.

46 See id. art. 38, 61 Stat. at 1191, 15 U.N.T.S. at 322. The Chicago Convention
sets forth a dispute settlement mechanism for instances where there is disagreement as to how to interpret or apply the Convention. See id. ch. XVIII, 61 Stat. at
1204-05, 15 U.N.T.S. at 352. It is infrequently used. In the case of failed negotia-
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The Chicago Convention is supplemented by a set of "technical annexes" dealing with specific matters of international standards.4 7 Upon a two-third majority vote,48 the Council adopts
international Standards and Recommended Practices and
designates them as Annexes.4 9 An Annex becomes mandatory
for all states that do not within sixty days notify the Council of
their intention to apply different national rules5 ° and for all traffic over the high seas.51 The advantage of this system, as noted
by Peter Sand, is that "[t]his flexible 'tacit consent' procedure,
designed specifically to reconcile the divergent requirements of
developed and developing nations, makes it comparatively easy
to adjust technical standards
by majority decision without forc52
uniformity.
complete
ing
A.

BILATERAL AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENTS

International civil aviation is also governed by a complex web
of bilateral air transport agreements. Although the Chicago
Convention established multilateral agreement in some areas
tions and an application of one of the concerned parties, the dispute shall be
resolved by the ICAO Council. See id. art. 84, 61 Stat. at 1204, 15 U.N.T.S. at 352.
A party may appeal the Council's decision to an ad hoc arbitral tribunal or the
International Court of Justice. See id. Where the parties to a dispute cannot
agree on the International Court ofJustice or on the choice of an arbitral tribunal, the Convention sets forth an arbitration procedure. See id. art. 85, 61 Stat. at
1204, 15 U.N.T.S. at 352. If an airline fails to conform to a decision rendered in a
dispute, each contracting state is to forbid that airline's operation in its airspace.
See id. art. 87, 61 Stat. at 1205, 15 U.N.T.S. at 354. The penalty for a state's nonconformity to a decision is suspension of its voting power in the Assembly. See id.
art. 88, 61 Stat. at 1205, 15 U.N.T.S. at 354.
47 The Annexes deal with the following subjects: Personnel Licensing (Annex
1); Rules of the Air (Annex 2); Meteorological Service for International Air Navigation (Annex 3); Aeronautical Charts (Annex 4); Units of Measurement to be
used in Air and Ground Operations (Annex 5); Operation of Aircraft (Annex 6);
Aircraft Nationality and Registration Marks (Annex 7); Airworthiness of Aircraft
(Annex 8); Facilitation (Annex 9); Aeronautical Telecommunications (Annex
10); Air Traffic Services (Annex 11); Search and Rescue (Annex 12); Aircraft
Accident Investigation (Annex 13); Aerodromes (Annex 14); Aeronautical Information Services (Annex 15); Environmental Protection (Annex 16); Safeguarding International Civil Aviation against Unlawful Acts (Annex 17); and The Safe
Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air (Annex 18).
48 See Chicago Convention, supra note 40, art. 90, 61 Stat. at 1205, 15 U.N.T.S.
at 356.
49 See id. art. 54(l), 61 Stat. at 1197, 15 U.N.T.S. at 334.
50 See id. art. 38, 61 Stat. at 1191, 15 U.N.T.S. at 322.
51 See id. art. 12, 61 Stat. at 1183, 15 U.N.T.S. at 304.
52 Peter H. Sand, Lessons Learned in Global Environmental Governance, 18 B.C.
ENVrL. AFF. L. REv. 213, 245 (1991) (citations omitted).
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(e.g., safety standards), it did not formulate an acceptable set of
multilateral rules relating to economic rights. The exchange of
economic rights between nations is effected through bilateral
negotiations that take place more or less under the umbrella of
Article 61' of the Chicago Convention. On a reciprocal basis,
states negotiate bilateral air transport agreements that deal with
issues of market access, airline tariffs, and capacity.54 In addition, the bilateral agreements address "the designation and licensing of airlines, their ownership and control, customs and
tax exemptions.., as well as the bilateral processes necessary for
agreement implementation, review, amendment and dispute
resolution."55 There are over 2500 bilateral air transport agreements worldwide.
Bilateral air transport agreements limit signatory states from
unilaterally restricting or taxing air services. For instance,
neither the Chicago Convention nor any general treaty prevents
countries from imposing tax on international aviation fuel sold
within their borders.56 However, nearly all of the bilateral air
transport agreements provide an exemption from fuel taxes on
a reciprocal basis for fuel sold to a foreign airline. 57 Any imposition of fuel tax by one bilateral partner on the airlines of another bilateral partner would require a review of, and
amendment to, the bilateral treaty obligations between the two
partners. Failing to do so would be a violation of the
agreement.
B.

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION

The Chicago Convention created the permanent ICAO. One
month after ICAO was established, the United Nations and
ICAO concluded an agreement whereby ICAO became a United
Nations' specialized agency with exclusive responsibility for all
53 Article 6 provides that scheduled international service may not be operated
over another contracting state unless there is "special permission or other authorization" by that state and "in accordance with the terms of such permission or
authorization." Chicago Convention, supra note 40, art. 6, 61 Stat. at 1182, 15
U.N.T.S. at 300.
54 See Public Information Office of ICAO, Memorandum on ICAO: The Story of the

International Civil Aviation Organization (visited Apr. 9,
www.cam.org/-icao/memo.txt>.
55

Id.

56See OECD Report, supra note 20, at 19.
57 See id.

1997)

<http://
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aspects of international aviation.5 8 The Chicago Convention
provides:
the aims and objectives of the Organization are to develop the
principles and techniques of international air navigation and to
foster the planning and development of international air transport so as to:
a) Insure the safe and orderly growth of international civil
aviation throughout the world;
b) Encourage the arts of aircraft design and operation for
peaceful purposes;
c) Encourage the development of airways, airports, and air
navigation facilities for international civil aviation;
d) Meet the needs of peoples of the world for safe, regular,
efficient and economical air transport;
e) Prevent economic waste caused by unreasonable competition;
f) Insure that the rights of contracting States are fully
respected and that every contracting State has a fair opportunity to operate international airlines;
g) Avoid discrimination between contracting States;
h) Promote safety of flight in international air navigation;
i) Promote generally the development of all aspects of international civil aeronautics. 9
ICAO's structure is set up to deal with a wide range of matters
affecting international air navigation and transport. ICAO is
made up of the Assembly, Council, and subsidiary bodies, with
ultimate control and authority vested in the Assembly, which
meets at least once every three years and is composed of representatives from the contracting states.6" Each state has the right
to be represented at the Assembly's meetings, and each state is
entitled to one vote, resulting in smaller, less powerful states
having as much voting power as larger, more powerful ones. 6'
Unless otherwise provided for by the Convention, a majority of
58

See ICAO,

AGREEMENT

BETWEEN THE UNITED

NATIONS AND

THE INTERNA-

ICAO Doc. 7970, art. 1 (May 10, 1948).
Chicago Convention, supra note 40, art. 44, 61 Stat. at 1192, 15 U.N.T.S. at

TIONAL CMIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION,

59

326.

60 See id. art. 48(a), as amended in Amendments to Articles 4 8 (a) 49(e) and 61 of the

Convention, Ass. Res. A 8-1 (1954) compiled in Assembly Resolutions in Force, at 1-16,
IACO Doc. 9662 (Oct. 4, 1995). Prior to its amendment, article 48(a) envisaged
an annual meeting of the Assembly. See Chicago Convention, supra note 40, art.
48(a), as originally written, 61 Stat. at 1193, 15 U.N.T.S. at 328.
61 See Chicago Convention, supra note 40, art. 48(b), 61 Stat. at 1194, 15
U.N.T.S. at 328.
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votes is required for the Assembly to make decisions.62 The primary powers and duties of the Assembly are to elect the Council;
take action on the Council's reports; determine ICAO's financial arrangements and review its expenditures; delegate matters
to the Council or the appropriate subsidiary body; decide
whether agreements should be made with other international
bodies; amend the Convention;63 and deal with any matter not
specifically delegated to the Council.64
The Council is the permanent body of ICAO. The Assembly
selects the thirty-three member Council for a three-year term.65
In contrast with the strictly one-state-one-vote of the Assembly,
the Council is composed of states that are of chief importance in
air transport, the largest contributors to the provision of facilities for international air navigation, and representative of all major geographical areas.66 Council representatives may not be
associated with the operation of international air service or have
financial interests in the sector. 67 This ensures the non-biased
representation of the contracting state, and that its representatives consider interests of aviation generally.6 8
The Council's duties are divided into mandatory and permissive functions. The Council's principal mandatory functions are
to submit annual reports to the Assembly, carry out Assembly
delegated matters, appoint the Secretary General and members
of permanent commissions, report infringements to the Assembly, adopt and modify the Convention's Annexes, and publish
information relating to air navigation and operation of international air services.69
The permissive functions, those which the Council may undertake by choice, are to create commissions to facilitate the
Convention's aims, research aspects of air transport and navigation of international importance, and investigate situations that
present possible obstacles to the development of international
See id. art. 48(c), 61 Stat. at 1194, 15 U.N.T.S. at 328.
amendment to the Convention requires both a two-thirds vote by the
Assembly and ratification by two-thirds of the contracting states to enter into
force. See id. art. 94(a), 61 Stat. at 1206-07, 15 U.N.T.S. at 358.
64 See id. art. 49(k), 61 Stat. at 1194, 15 U.N.T.S. at 330.
65 See id. art. 50(a), as amended, 61 Stat. at 1195, 15 U.N.T.S. at 330.
66 See id. art. 50(b), 61 Stat. at 1195, 15 U.N.T.S. at 330, 332.
67 See id. art. 50(c), 61 Stat. at 1195, 15 U.N.T.S. at 332.
68 See CAROLE BLACKSHAW, AVIATION LAW & REGULATION: A FRAMEWORK FOR
THE CIVIL AVIATION INDUSTRY 6 (1992).
69 See Chicago Convention, supra note 40, art. 54, 61 Stat. at 1196, 15 U.N.T.S.
at 334.
62

63An
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aviation.70 The Council is also responsible for submitting annual budgets to the Assembly, detailing receipts and expenditures.71 In addition, the Council adopts International Standards
and Recommended Practices, and incorporates them as Annexes to the Chicago Convention.72
There are several subsidiary bodies that are established under
the Convention or have been set up by the Assembly: Air Navigation Commission, which deals with technical matters; Air
Transport Committee, which deals with economic matters;
Legal Committee; Committee on Joint Support of Air Navigation Services; Committee on the Unlawful Interference of Aircraft; and Committee on Finance. 73 These subsidiary bodies do
much of the research and planning for the Council.
C.

CHICAGO CONVENTION TODAY

The Chicago Convention has achieved outstanding success in
creating an international institution that has developed a comprehensive body of international civil aviation rules. With 18511
member states, ICAO is considered one of the United Nations'
largest and most successful specialized agencies.75
Much of ICAO's work has focused on the technical aspects of
civil aviation. In particular ICAO has aided developing states
through its technical assistance programs. The work in developing countries has primarily focused on "the development of the
ground services required for civil aviation and, in particular, toward aerodromes, air traffic control, communications and meteorological services ... assistance to States in order to improve
their aviation security facilities and procedures. "76
70 See id. art. 55, 61 Stat. at 1197, 15 U.N.T.S. at 336.

71See id. art. 61, 61 Stat. at 1199, 15 U.N.T.S. at 340. Each contracting state is

responsible for its share of ICAO's expenses. Failure of a state to pay its financial
obligation may result in the Assembly suspending that state's voting power. See id.
art. 62, 61 Stat. 1199, 15 U.N.T.S. at 340. The result being that ICAO is essentially self-financed by its members. See B cIsHAw, supra note 68, at 9.
72 See Chicago Convention, supra note 40, art. 54(o, 61 Stat. at 1196, 15
U.N.T.S. at 334.
73 See MAREK ZYLICZ, INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT LAW 84 (1992); GIDWITZ,
supra note 39, at 9-11.
74 On December 21, 1996, Western Samoa became a contracting state of ICAO
thereby increasing membership to 185 states. See ICAO Membership, 52 ICAOJ. 23
(Jan.-Feb. 1997).
75 See DEMPSEY, supra note 38, at 13.
76 ICAO, Facts About ICAO, (visited Apr. 4, 1997) <http://www.cam.org/-icao/
facts.htm>.
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The Chicago Convention did not attempt to deal comprehensively with tax matters. Contracting states agreed to refrain from
imposing taxes or customs duties on aircraft engaged in interna77
tional aviation or on the fuel and oil on-board the aircraft.
This provision effectively prevents aircraft from being taxed on
its on-board fuel as it enters and leaves different countries. In
response to changes in international civil aviation, the ICAO Assembly sought to reaffirm and strengthen the principles of nontaxation. In 1993, the Council adopted a resolution, endorsing
a policy of reciprocal exemption from customs and duties for
fuel taken aboard for consumption by an aircraft engaged in
international air transport. 8
V.

ICAO AND THE ENVIRONMENT
A.

HISTORY OF INVOLVEMENT

ICAO has a history of interest and involvement in international environmental issues. In 1972, ICAO's position at the
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment was set
in Assembly Resolution A18-11, which provided: "in fulfilling
this role ICAO is conscious of the adverse environmental impact
that may be related to aircraft activity and its responsibility and
that of its member states to achieve maximum compatibility between the safe and orderly development of civil aviation and the
quality of the human environment.

79

In the same year, the Assembly also adopted Resolution A1812, which instructed the Council "to continue with vigour the
work related to the development of Standards, Recommended
Practices and Procedures and/or guidance material dealing
with the quality of the human environment" with the assistance
of other parts of ICAO and other international organizations.80
This resolution led to the establishment of an "ICAO Action
Programme Regarding the Environment."81 In 1977, an outgrowth of the programme was an ICAO Circular, entitled "Con77 See Chicago Convention, supra note 40, art. 24, 61 Stat. at 1186,15 U.N.T.S.
at 310.
78 See ICAO, ICAO's POLICIES ON TAXATION IN THE FIELD OF INTERNATIONAL AIR
TRANSPORT 3-4, Doc. No. 8632-C/968 (2d ed. Jan. 1994) (approved by the Councilon Dec. 14, 1993).
7. ICAO, Assembly Resolution A18-11 (1972).
80 ICAO, Assembly Resolution A18-12 (1972).
81 ICAO, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND RECOMMENDED PRACTICES, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, ANNEX 16 TO THE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION, v,

Vol. II (2d ed. Nov. 1993) [hereinafter

ANNEX

16].
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trol of Aircraft Engine Emissions. 8' 2 The Circular contained a
certification procedure for the "control of vented fuel, smoke
and certain gaseous emissions for new turbo-jet and turbofan
engines intended for propulsion at subsonic speeds. 8s3 Recognizing that the subject of aircraft engine emissions was not
purely technical, the Council established the Committee on Aircraft Engine Emissions in 1977 to address a number of aspects
of aircraft emissions.8 4 In 1981, this committee's work led to the
development of environmental protection standards relating to
emissions.85 These standards were guided by the philosophy of
achieving "maximum compatibility between the safe and orderly
development of civil aviation and the quality of the human
86
environment."

B.

ANNEX

16

Annex 16 to the Chicago Convention sets the international
Standards and Recommended Practices for the environmental
aspects of aviation and is aptly named "Environmental Protection. "87 Volume I of Annex 16 addresses aircraft noise and Volume II addresses aircraft engine emissions. Volume II calls for
the prevention of intentional fuel venting and establishes standards for aircraft emissions control through an engine certification scheme. Fuel venting occurs when a plane has been
designed in such a manner that the fuel nozzle manifolds discharge liquid fuel during normal flight or ground operations.88
Annex 16 requires that "all turbine engine powered aircraft intended for operation in international operation manufactured
after 18 February 1982" be designed and constructed to prevent
such an intentional discharge.89 In addition, Volume II limits
certain aircraft emissions through an engine certification process, depending on the age and type of the aircraft and establishes a highly technical process for measuring emissions.9 ° The

83

Id.
Id.

84

See id.

82

85

See id. at vii.

86

ICAO, Assembly Resolution A18-11 (1972).
ANNEX 16, supra note 81; see also ICAO, INTERNATIONAL

87

STANDARDS AND REC-

OMMENDED PRACTICES, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, SUPPLEMENT TO ANNEX
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION,
SUPPLEMENT].
88 See ANNEX
89

Id. at 3.

90 See id. at 6.

16-

Vol. II (2d ed. Dec. 1994) [hereinafter ANNEX 16

16, supra note 81,

at

4.
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emissions controlled and kept under review by ICAO are smoke,
hydrocarbons, CO and NO, from new engines. 91 Because aircraft engines are an international commodity, manufacturers
build aircraft to meet Annex 16 standards. Manufacturers of aircraft or engines must show that their product meets Annex 16
noise and emission standards before it can enter commercial
service.
Parties to ICAO have effectively undertaken a commitment
through Annex 16 to adhere to acceptable ceilings for aircraft
emissions.9 2 Under the Chicago Convention, countries that are
unable to abide by Annex 16 are required to notify ICAO of any
differences between their national regulations and practices and
the Annex's international Standards and Recommended Practices. In addition, contracting states are required to publish
their differences through the Aeronautical Information Service
as required by Annex 15.9 4 Eleven of the 185 contracting states
have notified ICAO of differences between their own practices
and those established by Annex 16 relating to NO, and CO
emissions stringency. 5 The United States, despite its international obligations and active participation in ICAO, until 1997
was not in compliance with Annex 16's NO,, and CO provisions
and had failed to notify ICAO of its differences. However, U.S.
air carriers purchasing new aircraft were in compliance with Annex 16 because aircraft engine manufacturers design and build
engines that adhere to ICAO standards.
The ICAO's Committee on Aviation Environmental Protection (CAEP), established in 1983, is charged with making recommendations regarding international noise and emission
standards to the decision-making bodies of ICAO. The CAEP's
members are experts in the field of aviation and the environment.96 The CAEP handles the majority of ICAO's environment-related activities. In December 1995, the CAEP
recommended a 16 percent increase in stringency for the NO,
standard applicable to medium and large engines to be
91 See id.
92 See id.

at v.
91 See Chicago Convention, supra note 40, art. 38, 61 Stat. at 1191, 15 U.N.T.S.
at 322.
4 See ANNEX 16, supra note 81, at v.
95 See PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW I:
FRAMEWORKS, STANDARDS AND IMPLEMENTATION 258 (1995). For more information on the types of differences, see ANNEX 16 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 87, at iii.
96 See R.I.R. Abeyratne, Legal and Regulatory Issues in International Aviation,
287 (1996) [hereinafter Legal and Regulatory Issues].
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designed for the first time in the year 2000 and manufactured
for the first time in the year 2008. 97 In April 1997, the Council
decided not to adopt this standard. As a result, the Emissions
Planning Group was established to formulate a proposal on aircraft emissions to be presented at the CAEP conference in April
1998.
C.

RECENT ACTIVITY OF THE ASSEMBLY

In 1995, the thirty-first session of the Assembly adopted a consolidated statement of ICAO's policies and practices relating to
environmental protection.98 Assembly Resolution A31-11 reiterates both ICAO's general principle laid out in Assembly Resolution A18-11 and the Council's need to maintain the lead in
developing guidance on aviation matters related to the environment, so as to not leave such initiatives to other organizations.99
In addition, the resolution urges states to ensure that any local
operating restriction based on engine characteristics "be
adopted only where such action is supported by a prior assessment of all possible adverse impacts"'0° and discourages states
from "unilateral environmental measures that would be harmful
to the development of international civil aviation."'' 1
Due to increasing international concern over global warming
and ozone depletion, ICAO has become an active participant in
these areas.'0 2 ICAO is working with other international bodies
to determine the extent of the aviation sector's contribution to
these environmental problems.0 3 Assembly Resolution A31-11,
Appendix F, deals expressly with the environmental impact of
civil aviation on the upper atmosphere. The Resolution directs
the Council to expand both its and CAEP's involvement in the
international global warming discussions by working closely with
the United Nations Environment Programme, the World Meterological Organization, the IPCC and the FCCC's Conference to
the Parties.'

0 4

97 See Arthur Reed, The Green Menace, 33 AIR TRANSPORT WORLD, 57, 57-59
(1996).
98 See ICAO, Assembly Resolution A31-11 (1995).
99 See id. at app. B.
100 Id. at app. E.

5.
101Id. at app. A,
102See Public Information Office of ICAO, supra note 54.
103See id.

104See ICAO, Assembly Resolution A31-11, app. F (1995).
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VI.

1992 U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON
CLIMATE CHANGE
A.

HISTORY OF NEGOTIATIONS

Concern about climate change intensified in 1988, when unusual weather and significant drought occurred in various parts
of the world. In response to these events, the international community established the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) in 1988, under the auspices of the United Nations Environment Programme and the World Meteorological
Organization. The IPCC is a U.N. scientific body directing international atmospheric research on global warming; its mission
is to provide policymakers with the best possible scientific assessment of global warming. The IPCC's goals are to (1) review and
assess the science relevant to climate change, (2) assess the possible environmental and socioeconomic impacts of climate
change, and (3) identify potential response strategies. In 1990,
the IPCC submitted its findings in the First Assessment Report to
the U.N. General Assembly and the second U.N. World Climate
Conference. 10 5 The U.N. General Assembly adopted the report,
which became the basis for the Framework Convention on Climate Change. 0 6
The FCCC was opened for signature at the 1992 U.N. Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro.
Over 150 nations signed the FCCC at the so-called "Earth Summit." The FCCC commits contracting countries to a voluntary
reduction of greenhouse gases with the aim of stabilizing emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000. The framework has provided the foundation for subsequent U.N. conferences on
global warming.
B.

OBJECTIVE AND GENERAL COMMITMENTS

The FCCC's ultimate objective is to:
[A] chieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system. Such a level should be
achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to
adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food produc105

See

CONGRESSIONAL

RESEARCH

CHANGE 7, IB89005 (Feb. 25,

106 See id. at 8.

1997).

SERVICE,

U.S.

CONGRESS,

GLOBAL

CLIMATE
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tion is not threatened and to enable
economic development to
1 °7
proceed in a sustainable manner.
To accomplish this objective, the framework sets forth a series of
commitments in Article 4. Unlike the Chicago Convention, the
FCCC distinguishes between developed and developing nations,
committing all to certain common obligations, but requiring
stronger actions on the part of developed countries. All countries are required to inventory their emissions and sinks of
greenhouse gases and to "[f] ormulate, implement, publish and

regularly update national and, where appropriate, regional
programmes containing measures to mitigate climate change
....
,,108 These obligations are qualified explicitly by the acknowledgment that nations "have specific national and regional
development priorities, objectives, and circumstances;"' 0 9 this
qualification may be to justify differing levels of achievement of
even these common duties.
The Framework language addressing the commitments for
developed countries-twenty-seven members of the OECD plus
the former Communist block countries, referred to as Annex I
countriesl°-is confusing and convoluted."' It neither reUnited Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992,
art. 2, 31 I.L.M. 848, 854 [hereinafter Climate Change Convention].
108 Id. art. 4(1)(b), 31 I.L.M. at 855.
109 Id. art. 4(1), 31 L.L.M. at 855.
110 The 36 Annex I countries are as follows: Australia, Austria, Belarus,
Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, European Community, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and
United States of America. Any country not classified as an Annex I country is
considered a developing country.
1I The binding commitments for Annex I countries are set out in Article 4(2),
which provides:
a) Each of these Parties shall adopt national policies and take corresponding measures on the mitigation of climate change, by
limiting its anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and
protecting and enhancing its greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs. These policies and measures will demonstrate that developed countries are taking the lead in modifying longer-term
trends in anthropogenic emissions consistent with the objective
of the Convention, recognizing that the return by the end of the
present decade to earlier levels of anthropogenic emissions of
carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases not controlled by
the Montreal Protocol would contribute to such modification,
and taking into account the differences in these Parties' starting
points and approaches, economic structures and resource bases,
107
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quires that greenhouse gas emissions be stabilized by the year
2000 at 1990 levels nor requires a return to 1990 levels by the
year 2000, as has been widely reported. 112 The framework language merely commits Annex I countries to communicate to
other parties information on their policies and measures to reduce "their" net greenhouse gas emissions with the "aim" of returning greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by the year
2000."' The FCCC does not contain any mechanism to enforce
these aims.
Annex II countries," 4 a subset of the Annex I countries, have
the additional responsibility of specific financial commitments.
They are to "provide new and additional financial resources" to
help developing countries comply with the reporting requirements. ' 5 In addition, Annex II countries must assist financially
those developing countries made vulnerable by global climate
change." 6 Furthermore, Annex II countries are to promote, fathe need to maintain strong and sustainable economic growth,
available technologies and other individual circumstances, as
well as the need for equitable and appropriate contributions by
each of these Parties to the global effort regarding that objective. These Parties may implement such policies and measures
jointly with other Parties and may assist other Parties in contributing to the achievement of the objective of the Convention
and, in particular, that of this subparagraph;
b) In order to promote progress to this end, each of these Parties
shall communicate, within six months of entry into force of the
Convention for it and periodically thereafter, and in accordance with Article 12, detailed information on its policies and
measures referred to in subparagraph (a) above, as well as on its
resulting projected anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol for the period referred to in subparagraph (a),
with the aim of returning individually or jointly to their 1990
levels these anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and
other greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol ....
Id. art. 4(2)(a) & (b), 31 I.L.M. at 857 (internal footnote omitted).
112 See id. art. 4(2)(b), 31 I.L.M. at 857.
113 The use of the word "their" is problematic for aircraft emissions since it is
not clear who is responsible for emissions over the high seas. See infra notes 134145 and accompanying text.
114 Annex II parties include: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
European Community, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and United States of America.
15 Id. art. 4(3), 31 I.L.M. at 858.
116 See id. art. 4(4), 31 I.L.M. at 858.
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C.

FCCC INSTITUTIONS

The FCCC establishes a Conference of the Parties to review
and promote the implementation of the Framework. 18 The
parties agreed that the adequacy of Annex I countries' commitments would be reviewed at the Conference of the Parties' first
meeting, and periodically thereafter, to determine whether additional action might be needed to move toward the FCCC's ultimate objective-the stabilization of greenhouse gas
concentrations. 19
The FCCC establishes a scientific body, the Subsidiary Body
for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA), to assess the
state of global climate change research, determine the feasibility
of technology research, assess the effect of measures taken
under the Framework, work with other scientific and international bodies, and answer questions posed by the Conference of
the Parties. 12' The Framework also seeks to establish a financial
mechanism for the administration of financial resources, but
fails to establish anything permanent. At the Earth Summit,
there was tremendous disagreement among countries as to how
the financial mechanism should work. 12' The Global Environment Facility is temporarily administering the FCCC's financial
mechanism.

22

D.

CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES

At the First Conference of the Parties in March 1995, the parties acknowledged that existing commitments under the FCCC
would not meet the objective of stabilizing greenhouse gas emissions. 12' The Annex I countries launched a new process (the
"Berlin Mandate") with a 1997 deadline for strengthening develSee id. art. 4(5), 31 I.L.M. at 858.
18 See id. art. 4(2)(d), 31 I.L.M. at 857.
117

119 See id.
120

See id. art. 9, 31 I.L.M. at 863.

121SANDS, supra note 95, at 280.
122 CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, U.S. CONGRESS, CONGRESS AND INTERNA-

TIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 14, 93-695 ENR (May 1993).
123 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GLOBAL WARMING: DIFFICULTIES ASSESSING
PROGRESS STABILIZING EMISSIONS OF GREENHOUSE GASES, H.R. Doc.
No. GAO/RCED-96-188, at 2 (1996), available in 1996 WL 546171 (F.D.C.H.)
COUNTRIES'

[hereinafter ASSESSING PROGRESS].
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oped countries' commitments. The parties hoped to "negotiate
a 'comprehensive menu of actions' from which countries may
pick and choose options to address climate change which, individually, make the best economic and environmental sense, as
well as a uniform approach to reporting emissions and measures."1 24 In addition, parties agreed to begin discussing post2000 options, focusing on strengthening the commitments of
the parties by elaborating policies and measures, as well as set125
ting quantifiable objectives.

At the Second Conference of the Parties in July 1996, the
countries endorsed IPCC's Second Assessment Report, agreed on
the contents of the first national communications that developing countries were to submit, and approved the "activities implemented jointly" pilot program for reducing global greenhouse
gases. 126 In a major policy reversal, the Clinton Administration
committed U.S. support for binding targets127 and rejected the
imposition of "harmonized policies and measures" at this conference. 128 The United States later proposed a protocol'

29

that

established a budget for emissions "that retains each party's flexibility with respect to the choice of domestic policies and measures to implement the target." ' 0
At the Third Conference of the Parties in Kyoto, Japan, the
parties agreed to the Kyoto Protocol. The agreement reached
in the Kyoto Protocol provides for developed countries to agree
to binding national targets for greenhouse gas emissions of C0 2,
methane, NOx, and three halocarbons used as substitutes for
ozone-damaging chlorofluorocarbons. Under the Protocol, in
the commitment period 2008-2012 the European Community's
members would be collectively bound to an eight percent reducsupra note 105, at 9.
See ASSESSING PROGRESS, supra note 123, at 4-5.
126 See Ministerial Declaration Released at Conference of Parties to United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change Dated July 18, 1996, [1996] Daily Env't
Rep. (BNA) 1996 DEN 139, at D26 (July 19, 1996).
127 The Clinton Administration issued the Climate Change Action Plan of
1993, a voluntary initiative designed to return emissions of greenhouse gases to
124 CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
125

1990 levels by 2000, in response to the FCCC. See ASSESSING

PROGRESS,

supra note

123, at 9.
supra note 105, at 12.
Dept. of State, Bureau of Oceans and Int'l Envtl. and Sci. Aft., Draft Protocol
to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, released Jan. 28, 1997 (visited Mar.
16, 1997) <http://www.state.gov/www/global/oes/protocol.html>.
130 U.S. Proposalfor Binding Controls on Greenhouse Gas Emissions Offered at U.N.
Negotiations on Climate Change Released by the State Department, [1996] Daily Env't
Rep. (BNA) 1996 DEN 236, at D32 (Dec. 9, 1996).
128 CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
129
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tion below 1990 levels; the United States, a seven percent reduction; and Japan, Canada, Hungry, and Poland, a six percent
reduction. Also, Russia, New Zealand, and Ukraine are to stabilize emissions at 1990 levels. Some countries would be permitted to increase their emissions: Norway by one percent,
Australia by eight percent, and Iceland by ten percent.'
Developing countries, such as India and China, were asked to set voluntary reduction targets, but refused.
The Clinton Administration's commitment to emission reductions has ignited a firestorm of criticism from industry leaders,
labor unions, and many members of Congress. As a result, the
Administration is not expected to seek ratification of the protocol in the Senate, where a two-thirds majority of support would
be needed, until at least 1999. The Fourth Conference of the
Parties is scheduled to be held in Buenos Aires, Argentina in
November 1998.
E.

KYOTO PROTOCOL: INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF THE

UNIQUE NATURE OF AVIATION

While the Kyoto Protocol's national targets apply to emissions
from almost all industrial sectors, they exclude emissions from
the international aviation sector. The Kyoto Protocol expressly
recognizes ICAO as the global organization responsible for the
reduction or limitation of international aviation emissions:
"The Parties included in Annex I shall pursue limitation or reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the
Montreal Protocol from aviation and marine bunker fuels, working through the International Civil Aviation Organization and
the International Maritime Organization, respectively." 132 In
protocol language, emissions of greenhouse gases from aviation
bunker fuels refers to aviation emissions. This provision makes
clear that ICAO is the principal forum for regulating international aircraft emissions. The question of whether ICAO is the
forum for addressing purely domestic aircraft emissions remains
open.
The Third Conference of the Parties also issued a "Decision
Statement" that states the following:
The Conference of the Parties, Recalling its decisions 4/CP.1 and 9/
CP.2, Endorsing the relevant conclusions of the Subsidiary Body
for Scientific and Technological Advice at its fourth session ...
131 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 1, at 30.
132

Id. art. 2(2), at 9.
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(4) Recalls that, under the Revised 1996 Guidelines for National
Greenhouse Gas Inventories of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change, emissions based upon fuel sold to ships or aircraft engaged in international transport should not be included
in national totals, but reported separately; and urges the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice to further elaborate on the inclusion of these emissions in the overall
greenhouse gas inventories of Parties.1 3 3
This Decision demonstrates the need to treat aviation differently
than other sectors.
VII.

WHY ICAO INSTEAD OF THE FCCC?

The Kyoto Protocol and its Decisions ensure that ICAO continues to retain exclusive jurisdiction for global aviation policy,
thereby avoiding fragmentation of global aviation environmental policy. ICAO's role as the organization responsible for providing information on international civil aviation operations and
developing policy guidance on possible means of reducing international civil aviation's undesirable effects on the environment
has been reaffirmed.
Prior to Kyoto, ICAO's technical expertise and ability to
achieve greater compliance with limiting emissions bolstered
the argument for the removal of aircraft emissions from the
FCCC's purview and the delegation of that responsibility to
ICAO. The Third Conference of the Parties recognized this,
and as a result, made ICAO the sole international forum responsible for regulating aircraft emissions. Described below are
some of the advantages of having international emissions handled by ICAO rather than the FCCC.

A.

AMBIGUITY UNDER THE

FCCC

Prior to the Kyoto Protocol, the U.N. climate change negotiations had failed to recognize the uniqueness of the global civil
aviation sector. In particular, the FCCC's treatment of aircraft
emissions is ambiguous because it is unclear how international
aviation emissions are to be allocated. The FCCC calls on countries to "aim" to limit "their" emissions.14 Traditionally, there
has been a strong connection between airlines and countries.
Commercial air transport since its inception has relied on the
133
134

857.

Id. at 31.
See Climate Change Convention, supra note 107, art. 4(2) (b), 31 I.L.M. at
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support of national governments.135 This connection may not
be maintained in the future given the trend towards privatization and the merging of airlines.1 "6 In addition, aircraft may for
economic reasons be registered in one country, but may actually
be leased or chartered for operation elsewhere.1 3 7 There is also
the added complication of where bunker fuel' 1 intake occurs
because the fuel intake does not necessarily take place in the
country of original departure. Also, a considerable percentage
of aviation operations is conducted over the high seas, outside
any countries jurisdiction.
The effect of the Framework's language is that domestic aviation emissions are included in a country's aim, whereas the
139
treatment of international aircraft emissions remains unclear.
The FCCC's Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological
Advice (SBSTA) is currently discussing aircraft emission allocations options for Annex I parties. 4 ° The options being discussed include:
1) No allocation;
2) Allocation of global emissions from bunker fuels to parties in
proportion to their national emissions;
3) Allocation to parties according to the country where the
bunker fuel is sold;
4) Allocation to parties according to the nationality of the transporting company, the country where the aircraft is registered,
or the country of the operator;
5) Allocation to parties according to the country of departure or
destination of an aircraft. Alternatively the emissions related
to the journey of an aircraft could be shared between the
country of departure and the country of arrival;
6) Allocation to parties according to the country of departure or
destination of passenger or cargo. Alternatively, the emisSee DEMPSEY, supra note 38, at 7.
See National Communications: Communicationsfrom PartiesIncluded in Annex I
to the Convention: Guidelines, Schedule and Process for Consideration: Addendum: Detailed Information on Electricity Trade and InternationalBunker Fuels (Subsidiary Body
for Scientific and Technological Advice) FCCC/SBSTA/1996/9/Add.2 (1996)
[hereinafter SBSTA Guidelines].
135

136

117

See id.

Bunker fuel is defined as fuels sold to any aircraft engaged in international
transport. See id. at 14 n.18.
139 See OECD Report, supra note 20, at 20. Under the Kyoto Protocol, however,
it is no longer clear whether domestic Aviation emissions are included in a country's aim.
140 See id.
138
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sions related to the journey of a passenger or cargo could be
shared by the country of departure and the country of arrival;
7) Allocation to parties according to the country of origin of the
passenger or the owner of cargo; and
8) Allocation to the party of emissions generated in its national

space. 141
SBSTA is studying options 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6 to determine the best
option for dealing with international aviation emissions. 42 Option 1, the "reporting of emissions by Parties in a separate category,' 41 would allow the FCCC countries to work through ICAO
to achieve emission reduction. 4 4 The Third Conference of the
Parties in the Kyoto Protocol's Decisions chose Option 1 pending further study by SBSTA. The primary problem with Options
3 through 6 is that they each lead to a disruption of the bilateral
air transport regime because countries are unlikely to implement the same policies and measures to manage aviation
emissions. 14
B.

TECHNICAL EXPERTISE

ICAO is the technical agency that establishes international
Standards and Recommended Practices for aircraft operations,
maintenance, and emissions. One example of ICAO's technical
expertise is the satellite-based system it has developed to address
the future Communications, Navigation, and Surveillance/Air
46
Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) needs of civil aviation.1
ICAO, more importantly, is an experienced regulator of aircraft
emissions, having played a leadership role in regulating aircraft
emissions since 1977. Through Annex 16, ICAO sets and adjusts
rigorous international pre-certification standards for aircraft
emissions.

ICAO is the only technical U.N. agency with the background
and expertise necessary to develop an international consensus
on a fair and effective aircraft emissions policy for greenhouse
gases. Any regulator of aircraft emissions must consider a complex set of issues, including the safety of aircraft modifications
required by new emissions requirements and the economic impact of technical and operational changes. ICAO has an appre141SBSTA Guidelines, supra note 136, at 20-22 (explanatory materials omitted).
142
143
144
145
146

See OECD Report, supra note 20, at 20.
SBSTA Guidelines, supra note 136, at 20.
See OECD Report, supra note 20, at 20.
See infra notes 155-158 and accompanying text.
See Information Kit, supra note 16.
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ciable understanding of this unique sector's needs and is well
equipped to develop an effective emissions abatement program.
For instance, the organization understands and appreciates the
147
balance that has to be reached between noise and emissions.
ICAO understands that it has only one engine to regulate, and
that regulating one component of the engine may affect how
another component works. It is this understanding that is so
crucial to ensuring the continued safety of the air transport
system.
C.

GREATER COMPLIANCE

The technological, political, and economic requirements of
verifying that parties are in compliance with the FCCC is difficult. A study by the General Accounting Office found that:
[FCCC's] goal to reduce greenhouse gas emissions cannot be
fully assessed because the emissions data are incomplete, unreliable, and inconsistent ....

Although the emissions data for car-

bon dioxide are considered to have a high level of certainty, the
data for other greenhouse gases are much less reliable. For example, the range of uncertainty for Canada's reported emissions
data on methane was plus or minus 30 percent at a 90-percent

confidence level and for nitrous oxide emissions, plus or minus
40-percent at an 85-percent confidence level. Such problems
limit the completeness and comparability of the inventories and
projections and therefore the ability to assess progress against
the [C]onvention's goal. The problems generally result from
lack of specific reporting requirements by the Convention and
from limitations in the ability to quantify certain greenhouse gas
emissions.14 8
Aircraft emissions are relatively easy to monitor and document.

ICAO has experience with measurement and verification of aircraft emissions. Delegating the monitoring of aircraft emissions
to ICAO results in better accountability.
D.

PREVENTS DUPLICATION OF EFFORTS

The inclusion of international aviation emissions under the
FCCC would have duplicated the work of ICAO. After all, ICAO
is a permanent executive body with a history of establishing international Standards and Recommended Practices for aircraft
operations, maintenance, and emissions. Elimination of waste
147
148

See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
ASSESSING PROGRESS, supra note 123, at 2 (footnote omitted).
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and duplication of work within the United Nations has been a
primary goal of the Clinton Administration. As Secretary of
State Madeleine Albright put it so eloquently:
We do think there is too much duplication. Every time there is a
need for a program it doesn't mean that there has to be a new
group formed that has to have its own stationery and its own organization and its director general. We are downsizing, the U.S.
government is downsizing, the U.N. has to downsize and become
leaner and more flexible for the duties that it has to perform, not
only at9 the end of this century but the beginning of the next
14
one.

In this era of fiscal conservatism, it is duplicative and wasteful to
have two U.N. organizations responsible for aircraft emissions.
The FCCC parties properly delegated responsibility for aircraft
emissions to ICAO.
E.

MINIMIZATION OF MARKET DISRUPTION

Tackling aircraft emissions is best done on a global level
through a comprehensive approach. Global measures are likely
to be more cost effective than national initiatives. 150 Failure to
pursue a comprehensive approach to international civil aviation
emissions results in market distortions. Adoption of the Kyoto
Protocol minimizes these distortions.
There are at least three ways in which a non-uniform approach to international aircraft emissions would have resulted in
greater emissions. First, if CO 2 charges on aviation fuel were not
internationally uniform, airlines would tend to buy more of
their fuel in countries that have no charge or those that impose
the lowest charge. Non-uniform charges would encourage airlines to "tanker," which reduces the amount of cargo that can be
carried, increases fuel consumption used in transporting the
tankered fuel, and causes higher greenhouse gas emissions. 15 '
Second, on long-haul flights that are required to make a stop,
incentive to travel via countries without restrictions on emissions
would increase.152 Passengers seeking the lowest airfares would
likely avoid those countries with emissions restrictions and
149 United Nations Ready for an Overhaul (Morning Edition, Nat'l Pub. Radio,
Sept. 19, 1995).
150 See OECD Report, supra note 20, at 35.
151 See id. Tankering is where an airline takes "on more fuel than is needed for
a flight to avoid taking on expensive or lower quality fiel at the next port of call."
Id. at 30.
152

See id. at 31.
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would instead fly via neighboring countries not imposing restrictions. If this resulted in passengers taking additional short-haul
flights to and from the long-haul departure point, the non-uniformity would again result in greater fuel use and a net increase
153
in greenhouse gas emissions.

Third, a non-uniform approach would create an inadequate
incentive for all airlines to adopt energy efficient technology.
On the other hand, the Kyoto Protocol's uniform approach to
aircraft emissions should encourage manufacturers to develop
energy-efficient aircraft and should also work to increase the
costs for those
manufacturers that do not adopt such
4
15

technology.

F.

DISRUPTION OF BILATERAL AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENTS

Without the Protocol's allocation of authority to ICAO, national emission targets would have upset the vast web of bilateral
air transport agreements. For instance, some countries may
have sought to reach their target by taxing aviation fuel. The
problem is that most of the bilateral air transport agreements
exclude the taxation of fuel used by each other's airlines. 5 5 Implementation of a fuel charge or tax by one state as a means of
addressing greenhouse gases reduction goals would either entitle another state to take retaliatory action or would require renegotiation of the country's bilateral air transport agreements. 5 6
Delegation of formulating the policy for aircraft emissions of
greenhouse gases to ICAO minimizes the likelihood of disruption to bilateral air transport agreements. ICAO accepts the
principle that countries can impose environmental charges on
airlines to recover specific air transport related costs. 1 5 7 However, ICAO does not accept environmental taxes that are not
earmarked. 5 8 By utilizing ICAO, the FCCC countries can be assured that steps taken to limit or reduce aircraft emissions will
not upset bilateral air transport agreements.

153 See id.
154 See id. at 35.
155 See id. at 19.
156 See id. at 9.
157 See id. at 19.
158See id.
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G.

INCLUSION OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

A comprehensive, long-term solution to global warming requires the cooperation of many countries and reductions in
emissions from many sources. Every country emits greenhouse
gases and shares responsibility for increases in emissions. In
1992, about eighty percent of the world's scheduled air traffic
was done by Annex I countries, with non-OECD Asia/Pacific.
countries accounting for the majority of the remainder. 5 9 The
demand for aviation services is expected to increase as developing countries' economies grow, thereby leading to an increased
use of fossil fuels and greater emissions of greenhouse gases.16 0
An international agreement's failure to include abatement by
developing countries limits the effectiveness of measures to contain global warming.
Neither the FCCC nor the Kyoto Protocol commit developing
countries to reductions in their emissions of greenhouse gases.
This means that developing countries, like China, are free to
burn as much fossil fuel as they want with no consequence except the slow destruction of the global commons. By addressing
aviation emissions within ICAO, the prospect of developing
countries taking corrective action is higher.
Effective limitation of greenhouse gases requires that developing countries participate in international agreements requiring
emissions abatement. ICAO has a long history of successfully
including developing countries in its programs.
[B]ilateralism has allowed some developing countries to negotiate access to developed country airline markets on a reciprocal
basis. In addition, extensive technical and other forms of assistance through ICAO as well as other assistance [programs] have
helped developing countries to achieve and upgrade technical
and safety standards and the development of their airport and
airspace for international operations, as well as to minimize their
disadvantages in both
human and financial resources in the air
6
transport sector. ' '
159 See id. at 13. The Asia/Pacific region is projected to have the fastest annual
growth in passenger and freight traffic, nine and ten percent, respectively, from
1995 to 2005. See id.
160 See EPA REPORT, supra note 9, at IV-15.
fil Whether InternationalAirline Services Should be Excluded in the GeneralAgreement
on Taiffs and Trade (GA7TI), HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House of
Representatives Comm. on Pub. Works and Transp., 101st Cong. 23 (1989).
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In an average year, the ICAO Technical Co-operation Bureau is
16 2
involved in more than 200 projects in about 100 countries.
Perhaps ICAO could help developing countries secure financing for additional emission-efficient investment, such as implementations of CNS/ATM. The Kyoto Protocol's allocation of
international aircraft emissions to ICAO means that developing
countries are more likely to be engaged in abatement of aircraft
emissions.
H.

A BETTER

16
WAY TO MAKE LAW

3

ICAO, unlike the FCCC, has the background and expertise
necessary to develop international consensus on a fair and effective aircraft emissions policy. International consensus is important for any action that affects the operations of, or imposes
costs on, international air transport. Several international lawyers have held up ICAO as a model to be followed for reaching
consensus on international environmental law. Peter Sand argues that ICAO
copes successfully both with the "bottomline" syndrome (by facilitating upward revision) and with the "slowest-boat" syndrome
(by dispensing with ratification). The net result is . . . a pattern

of procedures for improving the chances of a decision of the majority (be it simple or two-thirds)
of a "legislative" character se1 64
curing general consent.

ICAO, through the use of tacit consent, creates evolving norms.
For example, ICAO's standards are adopted unless a percentage
of the membership blocks them. If ICAO adopts standards,
states that find compliance impracticable may opt out. However, the pressure to comply is great, and as a result ICAO's standards enjoy widespread compliance. 6 '

162 The projects range from developing airports to installing communication
systems that cost anywhere from $100,000 to $12 million. The funds for these
systems come from the U.N. Development Programme or from trust funds established by the states. See Information Kit, supra note 16.
163

For more information on ICAO's legislative powers see

ABERYRATNE,

supra

note 96, at 14-20.
164

Sand, supra note 52, at 245 (quoting

DEREK BowE--r, THE LAW OF INTERNA-

146 (4th ed. 1982)).
165 See Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make InternationalEnvironmental Law, 86
AM. J. INT'L L. 259, 273 (1992).
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VIII.

[63

CONCLUSION

Even though civil aircraft generate a lower percentage of
emissions relative to other sectors, the increasing number of aircraft in the sky, as well as the lack of knowledge pertaining to
NO,, requires that action be taken to limit aircraft emissions. As
the parties to the FCCC recognized in the Kyoto Protocol, ICAO
is the proper forum to take such action. Concern, however, remains that the parties to the FCCC may in the future make decisions regarding aviation-and in particular domestic aircraft
emissions-without consideration of the sector's particular characteristics and the expertise of, and work done by, ICAO.

